While many protocols for sensor network security provide confidentiality for the content of messages, contextual information usually remains exposed. Such contextual information can be exploited by an adversary to derive sensitive information such as the locations of monitored objects and data sinks in the field. Attacks on these components can significantly undermine any network application. Existing techniques defend the leakage of location information from a limited adversary who can only observe network traffic in a small region. However, a stronger adversary, the global eavesdropper, is realistic and can defeat these existing techniques. This paper first formalizes the location privacy issues in sensor networks under this strong adversary model and computes a lower bound on the communication overhead needed for achieving a given level of location privacy. The paper then proposes two techniques to provide location privacy to monitored objects (source-location privacy)—periodic collection and source simulation—and two techniques to provide location privacy to data sinks (sink-location privacy)—sink simulation and backbone flooding. These techniques provide trade-offs between privacy, communication cost, and latency. Through analysis and simulation, we demonstrate that the proposed techniques are efficient and effective for source and sink-location privacy in sensor networks
Area of Project
Mobile Computing
Objective
The objective of this project is to providing location privacy in a sensor network.
Both Source and Sink Node location can be protected.
Existing System
Source-location privacy
Flooding technique
The flooding technique has the source node send each packet through numerous paths to a sink, making it difficult for an adversary to trace the source.
Fake packet generation
Fake packet generation creates fake sources whenever a sender notifies the sink that it has real data to send. The fake senders are away from the real source and approximately at the same distance from the sink as the real sender.
Phantom single-path routing
Phantom single-path routing achieves location privacy by making every packet walk along a random path before being delivered to the sink.
Cyclic entrapment
Cyclic entrapment creates looping paths at various places in the network to fool the adversary into following these loops repeatedly and thereby increase the safety period.
Sink-location privacy
Deng et al. described a technique to protect the locations of sinks from a local eavesdropper by hashing the ID field in the packet header.
Deng et al. introduced a multiple-parent routing scheme, a controlled random walk scheme, a random fake path scheme, and a hot spots scheme , redundant hops and fake packets are added to provide privacy when data are sent to the sink.
Proposed System
We propose privacy-preserving communication methods in the presence of a global eavesdropper who has a complete view of the network traffic. We include two techniques that hide the locations of monitored objects—periodic collection and source simulation—and two techniques that provide location privacy to data sinks—sink simulation and backbone flooding.